Understanding United States Mexican agricultural trade : prepared by a Task Force of the International Trade Research Consortium by Hillman, Jimmye S., 1923-
Understanding United States 
Mexican Agricultural Trade 
College of Agriculture 
International Series 8 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
Special Report 328 
July, 1985 

UNDERSTANDING 
UNITED STATES/MEXICAN 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
Prepared by a Task Force of the 
International Trade Research Consortium 
Jimmye S. Hillman, University of Arizona, Chairman 
Philip Abbott, Purdue University 
Maury E. Bredahl, University of Missouri-Columbia 
Myles Mielke, Economic Research Service 

UNDERSTANDING U.S./MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
Introduction 
Trade between the United States and Mexico reflects many things. 
It reflects the differing production patterns of a high-wage, mature 
industrial nation and that of a lower-wage, newly industrializing 
nation. Usually the trade flows reflecting that difference are 
complementary and mutually beneficial with the newly industrializ~ng 
nation importing capital intensive goods and exporting labor 
intensive goods; sometimes it is not. Trade reflects the demands of 
the world's largest consumer of energy and the supply of the 
fourth-largest producer of petroleum. It also reflects the rapidly 
expanding food and feedstuff needs typical of a newly industrializing 
nation and the world's largest exporter of agricultural products. 
Despite these complementarities, trade disputes have arisen as u.s. 
producers and their government have attempted to protect their 
markets from Mexican competition. Trade disputes have also arisen as 
Mexican producers and their government have attempted to substitute 
domestic production for imports as part of their economic development 
strategy. 
The trade flow, while reflecting industrial development, also 
reflects the unique interdependencies of the two economies. 
Understanding U.S./Mexican agricultural trade in this context 
necessitates recognition of the impact of U.S. monetary and fiscal 
policy on Mexico's economic growth and ability to import. It also 
necessitates recognition that macroeconomic policy decisions taken by 
the Mexican government dramatically affect agricultural trade as 
well. The interdependencies are further illustrated by the 
importance of Mexican labor to some areas of U.S. agriculture which 
could be curtailed by U.S. immigration policies. 
Outside of the impact of development and macroeconomic policies, 
trade flows and the resolution of trade disputes reflect the very 
different economic philosophies of the two nations. The domestic 
economic policies of the Mexican government are initiated and 
implemented in a series of detailed national plans for every sector 
of the economy. The economic structure of the United States, on the 
other hand, emphasizes the role of the market. These differing 
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philosophies lead to very different positions in international trade 
negotiations. 
Finally, agricultural trade reflects powerful political forces 
in both nations. Mexican policies reflect the needs of the poor 
producers and consumers, who make up a large segment of the 
population. Until recently, they have reflected a national goal of 
self-sufficiency in basic foods; current actions seem to reflect a 
national goal of self-reliance with a somewhat greater attention to 
international comparative advantage. U.S. policies reflect the 
interests of commodity groups and the national goal of increasing 
export markets. 
The factors affecting U.S./Mexican agricultural trade are many 
and their interrelationships complex. In this paper, the factors 
affecting agricultural trade are enumerated -- ranging from domestic 
policies to macroeconomic linkages -- and their interrelation is 
explored. Then, the political and policy environment within which 
attempts to expand mutual beneficial trade and to resolve trade 
disputes are discussed. In the end, a better understanding of 
U.S./Mexican agricultural trade and trade relations should result. 
Trade Overview 
Mexico is the fourth largest purchaser of all U.S. exports and 
the seventh largest purchaser of U.S. agricultural exports. The 
current level of trade understates the importance of the Mexican 
market to the United States as it has declined somewhat since 1982, 
the result of austerity measures taken in Mexico in response to its 
international debt crisis. The United States is even more important 
to Mexico. The United States purchased about 55% of Mexican exports 
in 1983 in spite of a Mexican policy to diversify markets for its 
most important export, oil. Mexico has become the largest supplier 
of U.S. oil imports. Mexico remains a significant agricultural 
exporter with the bulk of its exports going to the U.S. 
For many years trade between the United States and Mexico has 
been one of the largest and most rapidly growing in the world (Table 
1). U.S. exports to Mexico expanded from $795 million in the early 
1960s to a peak of more than $15.9 billion in 1981 with a three year 
average of about $12 billion for 1979-81. The United States has 
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TABLE 1 Mexican Total and Agricultural Trade and U.S. Share, 
Selected Periods, 1959-1983* 
1959-61 1969-71 1979-81 1982 1983 
Exports 
Total (mill ion US$)* 755.3 1373.7 14515.7 20929.1 22312.0 
U.S. Share 
(million US$) 465.3 868.2 8723.9 11115.9 12239.6 
u.s. % 61.6 63.2 60.1 53.1 54.9 
Agri cultura 1 
(million US$) 356.7 545.0 1845.0 1448.3 1401.8 
U.S. Share 
(million US$) 229.0 392.9 1130.5 1157.2 1279.4 
u.s. % 64.2 72.1 61.3 80.0 91.3 
Imports 
Total (mill ion US$)* 1110.7 2264.3 18621.3 14421.6 8550.9 
U.S. Share 
(million US$) 795.3 1415.2 11843.1 8969.3 4921.0 
u.s. % 71.6 62.5 63.6 62.2 57.5 
Agricultural 
(million US$) 81.0 196.3 2538.2 1693.6 2196.2 
U.S. Share 
(million US$) 59.0 114.6 1973.5 1156.7 1941.6 
u.s. % 72.8 58.4 7.8 68.3 88.4 
Source: USDA/ERS 
*U.S . share of total is overstated because Mexico does not report "in 
bond" trade but United States data includes that trade. 
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consistently supplied in excess of 60 percent of Mexican imports. In 
turn, the value of U.S . imports from Mexico increased from about $500 
million to $11.0 billion in the same 20 years. Much of the growth in 
trade reflects the economic growth of the oil boom of the late 1970s. 
Agricultural trade has followed the same basic pattern. The value of 
U.S. agricultural exports increased from slightly under $60 million 
to a peak of $2.5 billion, while U.S. agricultural imports from 
Me xi co grew from 1 ess than $300 million to an annua 1 1 eve 1 of about 
$1 billion after 1975. 
As a result of the rapid rise in U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico in recent years, the agricultural trade balance, which 
historically had favored Mexico, shifted in favor of the United 
States . Mexico enjoyed a $360 million agricultural trade surplus 
during much of the seventies, but this turned to an average deficit 
of $1.35 billion in 1980 and 1981. Since then the balance of 
agricultural trade has favored neither country. U.S. agricultural 
exports to Mexico are diverse, ranging from basic food stuffs to 
cattle hides and tallow. For the most part these exports complement 
Mexican production and aid in meeting their large and growing food 
needs. U.S. agricultural exports dominate the Mexican import markets 
for grains, oilseeds and livestock. Except for occasional shipments 
from Argentina and Canada, the United States supplies almost all 
Mexico's wheat, corn and grain sorghum. The oilseed market is shared 
with Argentina and Brazil, but the United States normally supplies 70 
to 90 percent. The United States is the major supplier of oil meals 
and most of the vegetable oils. Of the major import categories, only 
dairy products are dominated by other suppliers, principally the 
European Community countries, Canada and New Zealand. 
The United States and Mexico have a large bilateral trade in 
animals and animal products. Mexico imports breeding cattle and 
periodically the United States imports feeder cattle from Mexico. 
Mexican tallow and hide imports are almost exclusively from U.S. 
sources. Another important category for U.S. exporters is anima 1 
feedstuffs. 
Although its importance has fluctuated, the United States 
remains the principal foreign market for Mexican agricultural 
exports. Much of the flow of Mexican agri cultura 1 products to the 
United States provides those products not produced domestically. 
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Other agricultural exports complement U.S. production; a portion 
competes directly with U.S. production. Exports average about $1.1 
billion annually, about 7% of U.S. agricultural imports. This puts 
Mexico among the top four suppliers behind Australia, Brazil, and 
Canada. (The EC is an important supplier in aggregate.) 
As a commodity group~ fresh vegetables are the most valuable 
Mexican export in recent years. Tomatoes represent about half of the 
va 1 ue of that trade with the remainder accounted for by cucumbers, 
bell peppers, eggplant, and squash. In recent years these imports 
have supplied from 30 to 50 percent of U.S. domestic consumption. 
Coffee has been the single most valuable U.S. agricultural import 
from Mexico averaging about $250 million annually. Other important 
imports include cotton, citrus and processed vegetables. 
Although some trade reflects climatic advantage, to a large 
extent, agricultural trade flows resemble those that would be 
expected if each nation played to its comparative advantage. Mexico 
exports labor-intensive products (vegetables, for example) and 
imports capital-intensive products (cereals and oilseeds). 
Factors Determining Agricultural Trade 
The discussion of the factors determining the level and 
composition of trade is divided into two parts. The first section 
discusses the fabric of the political and policy environments of the 
two nations. The second explores the interdependency of the two 
economies and the spillover of their macro-economy policies to 
agricultural trade. 
Political and Policy Environment 
The respective economic policies of the United States and Mexico 
are very different. The domestic economic policies of the Mexican 
government are initiated and implemented in a series of detailed 
national plans for every sector of the economy. The Mexican 
government actively participates, directly or indirectly, in most 
sectors of the economy. In some cases, participation involves direct 
state ownership. In others, it involves such measures as price 
controls, tax incentives, and credit. 
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The economic structure of the United States, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the role of the market. The government establishes a 
system of general rules to guide actors in the market place, but the 
allocation of resources and. for the most part, the distribution of 
income are delegated to market forces. This attitude is exemplified 
in the stance taken by the United States in international trade 
negotiations. The United States supports the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a framework within which market forces may 
operate in the world economy and disputes may be settled in 
conformity with market standards of fairness. 
This basic philosophy conflicts with the "plan" mentality of 
Mexico. Mexican trade policy is a direct extension of that 
mentality. Simply stated, Mexican trade policies often place 
national development plans first and international relations second. 
Exports are not allowed until domestic consumption requirements have 
been met. 
needs. 
Imports are not allowed unless they meet with domestic 
This policy framework has not evolved as a series of capricious 
decisions of the Mexican government. Rather, it reflects the 
unrelenting pressure of the need to feed and provide employment for 
one of the fastest growing populations in the world. Simply to keep 
the level of unemployment and underemployment at historic levels --
themselves considered unacceptably high over 840 thousand jobs 
must be created each year. The pressure to provide jobs has led to 
extensive domestic content restrictions. that is • requiring 
components of consumer and capital goods to be produced in Mexico or 
to be assembled domestically. It was reasoned that this protection 
was necessary to protect "infant" industries until an internationally 
competitive position was reached. These policies coupled with the 
infusion of foreign capital produced one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. But further growth has been slowed somewhat 
as domestic needs have been met and protection from international 
forces has resulted in high cost industries and limited 
competitiveness in international markets. 
No facet of Mexican economic policy is more political or hotly 
debated than agricultural policy. The political necessity of 
providing cheap food to rural and urban poor while maintaining income 
for poor farmers pervades much agricultural policy. In addition, 
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food price policy has been a tool of industrial policy. Subsidizing 
basic food consumption held wages down and provided cheap labor for 
the industrial sector. Meeting these diverse policy objectives has 
resulted in government participation in all aspects of food 
production, consumption and trade. Intervention ranges from 
guaranteed producer prices and consumer subsidies, to government 
ownership of grocery stores, wholesale distributors, milk processing 
plants, and feedmills. Imports are viewed largely as an extension or 
result of these policies. 
Finally, the Mexican goal of national food self-sufficiency has 
affected trade. Within Mexico, many critics question the production 
of fresh vegetables and cotton for the export market. They reason, 
without regard to comparative advantage, that the land used for 
export production should instead be used to produce basic food 
grains. 
The intent of Mexican agricultural policy was clearly 
illustrated by the food system program (the Si.stema Alimentario 
Mexico or SAM) adopted at the peak of the oil revenues and economic 
activity. The program increased input subsidies, initiated crop 
insurance programs, increased producer prices and greatly expanded 
the role of government agencies in the food system. The stated goal 
of the program was national self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs by 
the mid 1980s. At the same time, consumer prices of a wide range of 
products were fixed at low levels. This necessitated processing 
subsidies which grew to unmanageable proportions as inflation 
increased . By 1982, some estimate that the cost of SAM had expanded 
to several billion dollars. The Mexican government was forced to 
abandon SAM as growth of oil revenues slowed and foreign obligations 
grew. But the SAM program reflected the basic philosophy of Mexico 
which will likely continue to be reflected in future food policies. 
All in all, a very complex and pervasive set of economic and 
political factors influence Mexican trade policies. These factors 
must be recognized at the same time that the mutual benefits of free 
trade are extolled. 
U.S. agricultural trade relations with Mexico are guided by 
international commodity agreements, the GATT and domestic food 
policies. Regulations and trade preferences embodied in 
international commodity agreements and the GATT have not been a 
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source of contention. Many of the trade regulations necessitated by 
domestic food pol icy have not significantly impinged on free trade 
but have served, at times, as a vehicle for U.S. producers to attempt 
to limit Mexican competition. 
U.S. tariffs are applied on a Most-Favored-Nation basis to all 
trading partners. As a result, despite the fact that Mexico is not a 
signatory to the GATT, the tariff structure does not discriminate 
against Mexican imports. Imports from developing countries may also 
qualify for duty-free entry under the Generalized System of 
Preferences ( GSP). The GSP 1 imits duty-free basis to those 
commodities for which imports either don't exceed a fixed dollar 
va 1 ue or that do not account for more than 50 percent of the U.S. 
market. Much of the U.S./Mexican trade does not satisfy these 
requirements. Nevertheless, imports from Mexico valued at $114 
mi 11 ion entered the United States in 1982 under the GSP program. 
Other commodities not covered by the GSP, such as fruits and some 
fresh vegetab 1 es, are a 11 owed duty-free entry during periods when 
U.S. production cannot meet domestic demand. At other times, import 
duties do not significantly limit imports. 
Mexican exports of beef, cotton, and sugar are subject to quota 
restrictions under U.S. legislation. 1 Sugar and coffee exports are 
subject to international trade agreement quotas. Currently only the 
cotton quota is sensitive for Mexican trade, since beef and sugar 
exports have dwindled in recent years due either to reduced supply or 
increased demand in Mexico. 
For individual commodities, such as tomatoes, Mexican imports 
are subject to the same provisions as domestic production under 
federal marketing orders. These marketing orders set minimum grade, 
size, maturity, and other quality standards for fresh produce shipped 
within the United States. As the principal export supplier of fruits 
and fresh winter vegetables, Mexico must comply with the local 
marketing order. Imports from Mexico subject to U.S. marketing 
orders include tomatoes, onions, oranges, grapefruit, and table 
grapes. 
These imports are also subject to health regulations requiring 
imports to be free of contagious diseases such as citrus canker and 
those carried by the Mediterranean fruit fly, both of which are found 
in Mexico. Citrus imports from Mexico were banned in 1982 following 
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an outbreak of citrus canker. Key 1 ime imports from most Mexican 
states will be prohibited because of fruit fly infestation. Live 
cattle and meat imports from Mexico must meet strict health and 
sanitary regulations before receiving an import permit. 
Changes in health regulations pose an adjustment problem for 
Me xi can producers. The proposed ban, to be in effect by October 
1985, on ethylene dibromide (EDB), a fumigant for crops in storage 
and in transit, will affect Mexican exports of fresh citrus, mangos, 
and papayas. This pesticide is widely used in Mexico on citrus 
crops. The lack of readily available alternatives for EDB in Mexico 
could force exporters to shift to processed products, primarily fruit 
juices. 
The United States has an active program to promote its 
agricultural exports. The U.S. government has facilitated Mexican 
importation of quantities of grains and oilseeds since 1980. 
Initially, the U.S.D.A. held public tenders in Washington, D.C., 
informed U.S. exporters of Mexican market opportunities, and helped 
to resolve shipping problems. More recently, export credit 
guarantees enabled Mexico to obtain financing from U.S. lenders. The 
agreement initially provided $1.3 billion with an additional $400 
mi 11 ion provided for October-December of 1983. The U.S. government 
cut back on the total value of the most recent guarantee program. As 
a result, Mexico has shifted some of its grain and oilseed orders to 
other suppliers, notably Argentina. 
The chief contrast between Mexican and United States trade 
policies is that international agreements, to a large degree, guide 
U.S. actions. Mexican actions tend to treat each case individually 
which requires a negotiated solution in each case. That is not to 
say that either country protects domestic markets more than the other 
but that U.S. protection is couched in domestic legislation or 
international agreements. 
Economic Interdependence 
The importance of macroeconomic policy as a determinant of 
international trade has been increasingly recognized; its particular 
importance to agricultural trade has recently been documented and 
explained in many places. It has been argued that domestic 
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agricultural policy and resulting posture in international markets 
which fails to consider international dimensions is doomed to 
failure. Hence, an understanding of U.S.-Mexican trade relations 
requires a better understanding of the international dimensions of 
macroeconomic policy and its implications for agricultural trade of 
both countries. 
Macroeconomic 
mechanisms . First, 
policy 
income 
affects trade through three important 
and the resulting level of demand for 
traded goods and services is a consequence of macroeconomic policy. 
One of the major consequences of Mexico's adjustments to its debt 
problem is the decline in real per capita income. Pressures on 
foreign reserves have reduced Mexico's capacity to invest, to import 
intermediate inputs, and so to grow economically. Recession in the 
U.S. has also severely limited markets for its trading partner's 
exports. Second, exchange rate movements are the consequence of 
relative rates of inflation, capital flows, and flows of goods and 
services, each of which is a consequence of macroeconomic policy. 
Exchange rates alter relative prices which, in turn, alter incentives 
to produce, consume and trade. Third, credit and investment flows 
across borders respond to macroeconomic conditions and so to policy. 
Mexico's debt problem has a decided effect on its ability to attract 
new credit, while changed economic opportunities drive Mexican 
investors to the U.S., putting further pressure on savings 
availability, the trade deficit, and the exchange rate. 
An understanding of the effects of U.S. and Mexican 
macroeconomic policies on these three factors income, exchange 
rates, and capital flows -- goes a long way towards understanding the 
evolution of economic outcomes in those countries and its effects on 
agricultural tr~de. 
U.S. Macroeconomic Policy 
It is necessary to first recognize that the U.S. is a large 
country in the international arena in that its actions affect 
international market conditions for virtually all countries. The 
dollar is the standard currency from which other currencies' values 
are set. Interest rates and investment prospects in the U.S. have a 
strong effect on international capital markets. The U.S. market is 
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large for most commodities. so that developments in the U.S. 
substantially alter prices and output worldwide. For a close trading 
partner like Mexico • the repercussions of U.S. policy are 
particularly significant. 
A brief discussion of the commonly held understanding of the 
evolution of the U.S. economy in reaction to the oil crises of 
1973-74 and 1979 illustrates the role and consequences of U.S. 
macroeconomic policy on the international arena and on Mexico in 
particular. After the initial crisis. the U.S. first attempted to 
isolate itself from events in international energy markets. The 
result was recession and shortages of energy. This recession, when 
transmitted abroad • affected the economic growth of U.S. trading 
partners. In response to international market realities. monetary 
authorities loosened control in 1975 and the rapid inflation of the 
mid and late 1970s was the consequence. Real interest rates, which 
fell and in fact were negative for a time. drove capital abroad and 
weakened the value of the dollar relative to other currencies. This 
adjustment spurred U.S. growth, however, and the rest of the world 
followed. Mexican exports to the United States increased rapidly. 
and capital flowed to the U.S. as investment opportunities looked 
better there. 
In 1979, however, the United States responded quite differently 
to the next round of oil price increases. With a reduction of 
inflation as their primary goal. monetary authorities have restricted 
the expansion of the money supply. Since the same discipline has not 
been applied to fiscal policy. the federal deficit has expanded 
rapidly. and the government has been forced to seek credit in capital 
markets. The consequence has been high real interest rates, a strong 
dollar, substantially greater investment by foreigners in the U.s •• 
and enormous trade deficits for the United States. While a strong 
economic recovery has recently been evident in the United States, its 
multiplier effects have not yet reached the rest of the world to a 
significant degree. In Mexico especially. exports to the United 
States have been slow to increase, because one important consequence 
of the recent recession has been a slowdown in demand for Mexican 
goods. However, the plight of Mexico and other nations has become 
particularly difficult • as reduction of export markets makes even 
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more difficult the generation of foreign exchange to repay debts 
incurred in the more favorable conditions of the late 1970s. 
Mexican Macroeconomic Policy 
Mexico's economic problems and developments in U.S./Mexican 
agricultural trade are not solely the result of U.S. policy. In 
contrast to the situation in the U.S., Mexico is not a large actor in 
the world economy, so that its policies most directly affect Mexican 
domestic outcomes, with only limited feedback onto the international 
market . We concentrate here on domestic consequences of Mexican 
macroeconomic policy because these are the most significant for 
agricultural trade. 
The overriding factor driving Mexican policy formation since 
1982 has been its international debt problem. In August of 1982, 
Mexico was required to reschedule its foreign debt under the 
supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, a 
number of austerity measures that limit imports and that are intended 
to reduce the government budget deficit were implemented. A 
deliberate undervaluation of the exchange rate has followed, as have 
currency controls to restrict capital flight. 
These measures have been highly successful in improving Mexico's 
trade to the point that exports (largely oil) have exceeded imports, 
allowing Mexico to make progress on debt repayment. The price Mexico 
has paid in slowing down its economy has been enormous. In contrast 
to the period 1970 to 1981 when Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent per year, in 1982 GDP declined 
slightly and plummeted by more than 5 percent in 1983. 
The economic adjustment program has not had a substantial effect 
on agricultural imports, due at least in part to the U.S. credit 
guarantee program. However, policy changes mandated by the economic 
crisis will affect agricultural trade in the future. Prior to 1982 
the subsidization of consumption of agricultural commodities was a 
major stimulus to demand. Industrial import substitution not only 
put further pressure on the budget but implicitly taxed the 
agricultural sector, thereby contributing to the stagnation of 
agricultural production. Cheap food and stagnating output led to a 
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rapid expansion of imports, particularly of grains and oilseeds. 
Budgetary restrictions have forced the Mexicans to cut back 
substantially on food, energy and other consumption subsidies. 
Reductions in these subsidies have been partially responsible for the 
real income decline and the resulting weakened food demand. 
The policy changes do not yet appear to have had as significant 
an impact on Mexican agricultural exports. The disastrous crop of 
1981/82 coupled with the U.S. credit program have kept U.S. exports 
at high levels. The success in Mexico's current account is 
attributable to import reductions of non-food products and energy 
exports, not to increased agricultural or other exports. 
Mexico's agricultural policies present institutional barriers to 
the kinds of adjustments needed in the agricultural sector if export 
earnings are to be increased. While the major macroeconomic 
variables -- GDP growth, the exchange rate, interest rates and 
inflation -- are of overriding importance and have adjusted as 
demanded by international circumstances, the agricultural sector and 
agricultural policies have not responded as much to these same 
forces. While explicit food subsidies have been reduced, implicit 
subsidies such as the preferential exchange rate for food imports 
continue. Sugar illustrates the consequence of price policies which 
led to disinvestment and increased consumption, so that sugar shifted 
from an exported to an imported good . While the decline in sugar 
prices was stopped in 1982, the real price level remains well below 
the mid-1970 levels. While sugar is an extreme example, similar 
stories could be told for wheat and corn. 
Recovery in Mexico is clearly in the interest of the U.S. 
agricultural sector. Mexico has emerged as an important customer of 
U.S. agricultural products while it has continued to compete in some 
agricultural markets as well as provide agricultural products 
complementary to U.S. production. Agricultural pol icy recognizing 
the consequences of macroeconomic po 1 icy in both countries and its 
effect on international market conditions should be formulated. If 
protectionist measures and macroeconomic policy in the U.S. force 
Mexico to look inward for the adjustments necessary to solve its 
current economic problems, long-run agricultural trade may be the 
victim. 
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Resolving Trade Disputes 
As Mexico turns increasingly to export markets for much needed 
foreign exchange and economic stimulus. it seems inevitable that 
trade disputes will arise as U.S. producers react to import pressure. 
The final aspect of understanding Mexican/U . S. trade is identifying 
the past and potential sources of trade disputes and the process by 
which each will be resolved. 
In order to implement their import substitution policy. the 
Mexican government administers an extensive system of import and 
export licensing. Numerous disputes have surfaced between the United 
States and Mexico over the use of licenses to control Mexican trade 
of agricultural products. For example. owing to increased domestic 
demand. the government or Mexico suspended the export of meat 
products to the United States in 1979. An embargo on live cattle 
exports also was attempted at that time. In both cases. the Mexican 
government acted unilaterally. neglecting to apprize the United 
States beforehand of its intent. 
U.s .-Mexican trade negotiations have consistently reached an 
impasse on the question of prior consultation and notification. The 
United States has complained that actions such as those mentioned 
above introduced unneeded instability into bilateral trade. Mexico. 
on the other hand. has insisted that the actions were needed to 
manage the domestic economy. Because Mexico has not joined GATT. the 
issue of prior consultation and notification can be resolved only 
through bilateral agreement. 
A prime objective of the U.S. negotiators at the Tokyo Round of 
the GATT negotiations (1973-1979) was the reduction of export 
subsidies. The outcome of the negotiations was the GATT Code on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The United States agreed to 
include an injury test in its countervailing duty. providing that the 
other code signatories agreed to "discipline" on export subsidies. 
Throughout the Tokyo Round. Mexico maintained a position 
fundamentally opposed to the intent and direction of the 
negotiations. It advocated nonreciprocal concessions to developing 
countries by developed countries. particularly the United States. and 
insisted on its right to subsidize domestic industries. Mexico 
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ultimately rejected the Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
and has not negotiated a bilateral agreement with the United States. 
With no formal international rules to guide negotiations, every 
dispute must be handled on a case-by-case basis. U.S. parties must 
rely on U.S. legislation. Mexico is gambling that its strategic 
importance to the United States will ensure favorable resolution of 
disputes despite the provisions of U.S. trade statutes. So far, the 
gamble has paid off. 
In accordance with the GATT, U.S. trade law distinguishes 
between "fair" but injurious imports and "unfair" imports. In the 
case of imports that are not unfairly aided by the exporters' 
government (fair imports), a U.S. producer can petition for relief by 
means of a tariff or quota under the "escape clause" codified in 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. The petitioner must 
demonstrate substantial injury or the probability of substantial 
injury from import competition. The Department of Commerce 
International Trade Commission (ITC) decides the merits of each case 
and recommends an appropriate action to the President. The 
President, in turn, may choose to implement the ITC recommendation or 
some alternative. 
Imports unfairly aided by the practices and policies of foreign 
governments are the focus of the "unfair" import legislation. An 
injured party in the United States is entitled to redress. The 
practice of selling goods in the U.S. market at a price less than 
cost of production or the price in the home market may be countered 
by antidumping duties; policies that subsidize exports may be 
countered by countervailing duties; and export policies that violate 
an international agreement or the norms of free trade may be 
countered by other appropriate action under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974. As in the case of "fair" import relief, injury must be 
demonstrated, but the degree of injury that must be demonstrated is 
substantially less. 
The countervailing duty legislation directed at subsidized 
exports is particularly important in trade between the United States 
and Mexico. Formerly, the Mexican government attempted, sometimes at 
great cost, to maintain a fixed exchange rate between the peso and 
the dollar, despite a domestic inflation rate that greatly exceeded 
that in the United States. The resultant overvaluation of the peso 
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hurt the competitiveness of Mexican exporters. To compensate, 
therefore, the Mexican government employed a battery of export 
subsidies. More recently, U.S. steel producers have charged that 
Me xi can stee 1 exports are subsidized. These producers have sought 
relief under U.S. anti-dumping legislation. 
Under the Trade Act of 1979, petitions against imports from 
countries that are not signatories of the GATT Subsidies Code need 
not demonstrate injury. Given the extensive subsidy program of 
Mexico, this change in the trade statutes increased the vulnerability 
of Mexican exports to ·actions by U.S. producers. But the Trade Act 
is not sufficiently clear about which imported goods are covered by 
the exception. Consequently, the question of the need to demonstrate 
injury has become an important part of countervai 1 i ng duty cases. 
The confusion surrounding the applicability of the 1979 Trade Act has 
lessened its reliability. 
Despite the vulnerability of Mexican exports to restriction 
under the statute, very few actions have actually been initiated and 
even fewer have resulted in relief for U.S. agricultural producers 
producers. Only in the single case of leather wearing apparel have 
U.S . producers won relief under the provisions of U.S. trade law 
(Table 2). 
Summary 
U.S./Mexican agricultural trade relations are shaped within the 
framework of a complex assortment of economic and political forces. 
The nature and extent of these forces, the focus of this paper, 
should serve as the background to understand the 1 eve 1 and 
composition of U.S./Mexican agricultural trade. It should not serve 
as the basis for rationalizing protectionism in either country, but 
rather for facilitating the search for increasing mutually beneficial 
trade. Clearly, both nations must recognize the pervasiveness of 
their economic interdependency. 
The importance of trade between the United States and Mexico is 
not totally reflected by the market statistics on imports and 
exports. Mexico, as the seventh largest importer of U.S. 
agricultural products, and the United States, as the ·purchaser of 
most of Mexico's agricultural exports, are mutually much more 
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important to each other because of geography and culture. The 
location of Mexico in relation to the United States and the Latin 
American countries puts it in a vital position for political 
purposes. Moreover, the historical and the continuing cultural ties 
between millions of people in the two countries multiplies the 
significance of economic statistics, including trade phenomena. 
The political and policy environment, economic interdependence, 
United States macroeconomic policy, and Mexican macroeconomic policy 
are all important factors which impinge on trade relations between 
the two countries. Trade disputes will arise inevitably as producers 
in both Mexico and the United States react to pressures emanating 
from increased imports. Resolving such disputes will be of major 
importance for all concerned. 
The GATT has not provided the framework to withstand 
protectionism in the current global economic recession. It does not 
address many issues that have emerged in recent years. The time is 
at hand to move toward a new round of negotiations aimed at 
establishing trade guidelines acceptable to newly-industrializing 
nations -- such as Mexico -- and the mature, industrialized nations 
-- such as the United States. In a very rea 1 sense, our futures 
depend on it. 
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TABLE 2 Summary of Mexican-U.S. Agricultural Trade Disputes 
Initiated by U.S. Agricultural Producers 
Date Commodity Legislation Actions 
1971 Fresh Eggs Anti-dumping Less than fair value sales 
found but no 1nJury 
determined. 
1973 Asparagus (Fresh Escape No restrictions applied. 
and Processed) Clause 
1975 Shrimp Escape No restrictions applied. 
Clause 
1975 Asparagus Section 201 No restrictions applied. 
1976 Honey Escape No restrictions applied. 
Clause 
1978 Textiles and Section 201 No restrictions applied. 
Products 
1978 Fresh Winter Anti-dumping No less than fair value 
Vegetables sales found. 
1980 Leather Wearing Counter- Countervailing duty of 5 
Apparel vail ing duty percent imposed. 
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Footnotes 
1Mexican beef exports to the United States are subject to 
"voluntary constraints" which limit imports if a global quota is 
exceeded. If total imports exceed a predetermined volume, then 
quotas may be imposed. 
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